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LIFE TERMS OR DEATH SENTENCES: THE
UNEASY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT
RICHARD R. W. BROOKS* AND STEVEN RAPHAEL"
I. INTRODUCTION
One day Louise Harris approached her lover, Lorenzo "Bo Bo"
McCarter, with a proposition that led to an agreement to kill her hus-
band.' Harris and McCarter paid Michael Sockwell and Alex Hood
one hundred dollars to carry out the gruesome killing.2 Following the
killing, Harris, McCarter, Sockwell, and Hood were all convicted of
capital murder in separate proceedings. In each case, a jury recom-
mended life in prison without parole. Yet, in two of the four cases,
the trial judge declined to follow the jury recommendations, choosing
instead to sentence the defendants to death by electrocution. Differ-
ent sentences following guilty verdicts on the same offense often oc-
cur because the "guilty/not-guilty" determination affords only the
crudest approximation of culpability. Through sentencing, however,
mitigating and aggravating considerations can give countenance to
culpability. Still, the juries in the Harris murder cases had access to
these considerations when they reached the same sentence recom-
Assistant Professor of Law at Northwestern University. Thanks to Stuart Banner, Leigh
Bienen, Shari Diamond, Thomas Geraghty, Steve Lubet, and Gerald Rosenberg. Marcia
Lehr and Christian Scott provided able and thoughtful research assistance.
.. Professor, Goldman School of Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley. Thanks
to Leigh Bienen and Rob MacCoun.
1 Harris's husband, a local deputy sheriff, had death benefits worth one quarter of a mil-
lion dollars, which the co-conspirators allegedly planned to share.
2 As Deputy Sheriff Isaiah Harris came to a stop sign while driving to work in his 1979
Ford Thunderbird, Sockwell jumped out of the bushes holding a shotgun, pointed it at the
deputy's face, and fired at close range. "As a result, the lower half of the victim's face was
blown off, leaving his teeth, tongue, and 'matter' from his face blown across the car." Harris
v. State, 632 So. 2d 503, 508 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992), aff'd sub nom.Ex Parte Harris, 632 So.
2d 543 (Ala. 1993), aff'd sub nom. Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504 (1995) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (affirming the Alabama Supreme Court decision sustaining the defendant's convic-
tion and death sentence).
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mendation for all four defendants. Why two defendants ultimately
received death sentences and two received life sentences is a question
that has more to do with the trial judge's temperament and discretion
to impose his preferences than with some "objective" balancing of
mitigating and aggravating circumstances.3 In this Article, we at-
tempt to measure the extent to which judicial temperament affects the
likelihood of a defendant being found guilty of murder and the im-
pact of specific judges on sentencing. Using detailed historical data
on all murders recorded by the Chicago police over a sixty-year pe-
riod during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, we find
significant judge-specific effects for both convictions and sentencing
outcomes. Our analysis also reveals a consistent pattern of harsher
outcomes correlated with the race of the defendant,4 the race of the
victim,5 and the killing of police officers. Further, we observe a
strong relationship between election years for judges and the likeli-
hood that a defendant will receive a death sentence. That is, condi-
tional on being found guilty of murder, criminal defendants were ap-
proximately 15% more likely to be sentenced to death when the
sentence was issued during the judge's election year.
3 Sentencing disparity would result even if it were possible to weigh aggravating and
mitigating circumstances objectively among defendants and judges. For example, consider
the four traditional motivations for criminal sentencing: rehabilitation, incapacitation, deter-
rence, and just deserts. When sentencing a particular criminal defendant, judges with a pref-
erence for incapacitation will often reach different sentences from judges who place more
weight on rehabilitation, even if they weigh the mitigating and aggravating circumstances
around the offense equally. "[T]his predictable disagreement causes a troublesome result:
two offenders identical in all relevant respects who have committed identical offenses may
receive very different sentences." Paul H. Robinson, One Perspective on Sentencing Reform
in the United States, 8 CRIM. L.F. 1, 5 (1997).
4 Our research findings are consistent with the long-acknowledged pattern of blacks be-ing convicted and executed at higher rates than whites prior to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972). Research on capital cases since Furman has revealed a less consistent racialpattern in terms of conviction and execution rates. To explain the change, scholars have
pointed to increased minority representation on juries and the end of rape's classification as
a capital offense, among other factors. See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN
AMERICAN HISTORY 289 (2002).
' Our findings are also consistent with the more recently identified "race of the victim
effect." That is, regardless of the defendant's race, murderers of white victims are several
times more likely to receive a death sentence. See DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE
AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990); Alan Widmayer &
James Marquart, Capital Punishment and Structured Discretion: Arbitrariness and Dis-
crimination after Furman, in CORRECTIONAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 178 (Clayton A. Hartjen
& Edward E. Rhine eds., 1992).
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A. POLITICS AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
In Louise Harris's death sentence appeal before the U.S. Su-
preme Court, Justice John Paul Stevens remarked that judges may be
too responsive "to political pressures when pronouncing sentence in
highly publicized capital cases." 6 Given the broad support of capital
punishment among Americans, Justice Stevens observed that "judges
who covet higher office-or who merely wish to remain judges-
must constantly profess their fealty to the death penalty."7 When up
for re-election, most judges simply cannot afford to ignore popular
sentiment about the death penalty. Nor, apparently, can many other
elected officials.8 For instance, one recent study found that during
gubernatorial election years, states are 25% more likely to execute
6 Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 520 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Challenging the
Alabama trial judge's decision to execute Harris notwithstanding the life sentence recom-
mendation of the jury, Justice Stevens observed in his dissent that Alabama judges over-
turned jury recommendations for life sentences in 47 cases, while reversing juries in only 5
cases where they recommended death. Id. at 521. Similar patterns, where judges were more
likely to reverse juries on life sentences rather than death sentences, were also identified in
Florida and Indiana. Id. at 521 n.8. "Not surprisingly, given the political pressures they face,
judges are far more likely than juries to impose the death penalty." Id. at 521. Of course,
judges may disproportionately reverse juries recommending life sentences simply because
juries are more prone to make errors in those cases, in comparison to cases where death may
appear clearly warranted.
7 Id. at 519. A correlation between political events and judicial sentencing may exist
even in states where there is no genuine competition in the electoral process (such as in Mis-
sissippi, where very few judgeships are contested in primary or general elections). James
Alfini, Mississippi Judicial Selection: Election, Appointment, and Bar Anointment, in
COURTS AND JUDGES 253, 255-60 (James Cramcr ed., 1981). Stephen B. Bright, Elected
Judges and the Death Penalty in Texas: Why Full Habeas Corpus Review by Independent
Federal Judges is Indispensable to Protecting Constitutional Rights, 78 TEX. L. REv. 1805,
1832 (2000) ("[J]udges ignore public attitudes and their political supporters at the peril of
losing their positions in the next election.")[hereinafter Bright, Elected Judges]; see also
Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice be Done Amid Efforts to
Intimidate and Remove Judges From Office for Unpopular Decisions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV.
308 (1997) [hereinafter Bright, Political Attacks]; John D. Fabian, The Paradox of Elected
Judges: Tension in the American Judicial System, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 155 (2001); cf
Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 973 (2001) (arguing
for the importance of an electoral system for state judges, while conceding the existence of
unwanted political influence over judicial decision-making).
8 The term "political suicide" is often used to describe the likely consequences when
elected officials appear unsupportive of capital punishment. See James R. Acker & Charles
S. Lanier, May God-or the Governor-Have Mercy: Executive Clemency and Executions in
Modern Death-Penalty Systems, 36 CRiM. L. BULL. 200, 210 n.53 (2000) and accompanying
text. See also BANNER, supra note 4, at 276 (recalling the role the death penalty played in
the 1988 presidential campaign between George H. Bush and Michael Dukakis (exemplified
by Willie Horton), and later in the 1992 campaign between George H. Bush and Bill Clinton
(exemplified by Ricky Rector)).
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prisoners.9 Prosecutorial election cycles have also been long known
to correlate with the state's willingness to seek death sentences in
murder cases."0 It would be surprising if judges, during their election
cycles, were unresponsive to the political pressures confronting their
elected counterparts in the governors' and prosecutors' offices.11 In
these offices, the pressure is often relieved through an exercise of gu-
bernatorial or prosecutorial discretion. One might expect that in ju-
dicial chambers and courtrooms throughout the country, judicial dis-
cretion serves a similar purpose.
B. JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND JUDGE SPECIFIC EFFECTS
Judicial discretion can, of course, be good or bad. Through dis-
cretion, judges can tailor punishments to conform to socially desir-
able objectives. Unfortunately, judicial discretion based on unwar-
ranted considerations, such as re-election prospects or ethnicity, will
lead to undesirable variations in sentencing. 2 In response to growing
9 See JEFFERY D. KUBIK & JOHN R. MORAN, LETHAL ELECTIONS: GUBERNATORIAL
POLITICS AND THE TIMING OF EXECUTIONS (Center for Policy Research, Syracuse University,
Working Paper, 2001). Although grants of clemency were once a more common practice, in
recent decades governors have grown increasingly unwilling to commute death sentences,
Illinois' recent mass commutation notwithstanding. "Part of clemency's decline [is] attrib-
utable to the growing popularity and salience of the death penalty. A commutation could be
political suicide for an elected official .... " BANNER, supra note 4, at 291. Part of the de-
cline in gubernatorial clemency may also be attributed to the constraints of the Supreme
Court's constitutional rulings on the capital punishment beginning with Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972) and Gregg v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 1301 (1976). "Mercy had been ban-
ished from the system, replaced by an arcane set of rules that haphazardly selected who
would live and who would die." BANNER, supra note 4, at 309-10.
10 BANNER, supra note 4, at 288 ("Whether a defendant was charged with capital or non-
capital murder depended largely on whether the prosecutor was up for reelection.").
1 Indeed, even after being elected, scholars and practitioners have also charged that po-
litical considerations such as patronage and commitment to campaign platforms are often
present when judges appoint counsel to represent indigent capital offense defendants. See
Bright, Elected Judges, supra note 7, at 1806 ("Texas trial judges-some treating the ap-
pointment of counsel to defend poor defendants as political patronage and some assigning
lawyers... to help move their dockets-have frequently appointed incompetent lawyers to
defend those accused of capital crimes." (footnotes omitted)); Gerald F. Uelmen, The Fattest
Crocodile: Why Elected Judges Can't Ignore Public Opinion, 13 CRIM. JUST. 4, 9 (Spring
1998) (observing that "j]udges who owe their elections to a campaign commitment to en-
forcing the death penalty will be more likely to countenance lazy and sloppy lawyers").
12 Numerous studies and anecdotal accounts that have pointed to sentencing variation
resulting from such unwarranted factors as the region of the country where the defendant
was convicted, the defendant's race, and the defendant's gender, among other factors. See
Kathleen Daly & Michael Tonry, Gender, Race, and Sentencing, in 22 CRIME & JUSTICE: A
REVIEW OF RESEARCH 201 (Michael Tonry ed., 1997); Debra A. Curran, Judicial Discretion
and Defendant's Sex, 21 CRIMINOLOGY 41 (1983); John Hagan & Kristin Bumiller, Making
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perceptions of widespread variations of this sort, the U.S. Congress
passed the Sentencing Reform Act in 1984.3 This Act came nearly
one century after studies first identified systemic sentencing variabil-
ity due to individual differences among judges.14 One early analysis
of discretion in judicial decision-making was offered by George
Everson in this journal in 1919."5 Everson analyzed the sentencing
patterns of approximately forty judges on the New York Magistrates'
Court: "With the consent of the Chief City Magistrate the Committee
on Criminal Courts went over the record of 155,000 or so cases dis-
posed of in 1914. . . ."" Significant variations were found: "The re-
sults showing to what extent justice is affected by the personality of
the judges were so startling and disconcerting that it seemed advis-
able to discontinue the comparative tables of the records of the jus-
tices."17 Several years later, Frederick Gaudet and his colleagues ex-
amined 7442 randomly assigned cases in one New Jersey jurisdiction
and observed stark differences among the sentencing behavior of
judges.8
To be confident that these observed differences in sentencing
were due to the judicial temperament and not other "non-judge" fac-
tors that are correlated with particular judges, Everson and Gaudet, et
al., relied on random case assignments. Randomly assigned cases
will control for these non-judge factors, assuming that the number of
cases is sufficiently large. Reliance on randomly assigned cases con-
tinues to be a useful methodological device for research on judicial
decision-making. For example, Joel Waldfogel recently analyzed
Sense of Sentencing: A Review and Critique of Sentencing Research, in 2 RESEARCH ON
SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 1 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1983).
13 The U.S. Congress observed that sentencing outcomes for similar offenses were "un-
justifiably wide" when it created and charged the Sentencing Commission with devising the
sentencing guidelines. See Sentencing Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837
(1984)(codified in 18 U.S.C. §355 1), which mandated the creation of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. See also Martin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CrN. L. REv. I
(1972) (offering an early criticism of sentencing variation among federal judges); Robinson,
supra note 3; cf Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for
Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 901 (1991) (arguing there is too much uniformity,
rather than too little, in sentencing).
14 Francis Galton, Terms of Imprisonment, 52 NAT. 174, 174-76 (June 20, 1895).
15 George Everson, The Human Element in Justice, 10 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 90
(1919).
6 Id. at 96.
17 Charles Grove Haines, General Observations on the Effects of Personal, Political and
Economic Influences in the Decisions of Judges, 17 ILL. L. REv. 96, 105 (1922).
18 Frederick J. Gaudet et al., Individual Differences in the Sentencing Tendencies of
Judges, 23 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 811 (1933).
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data from federal criminal cases that were randomly assigned to ten
judges in the Northern District of California from 1984 to 1987.'9 He
too found statistically significant inter-judge disparity. Similarly,
James Anderson and his colleagues relied on random assignments
over 77,201 federal cases from 1981 to 1993 to show a reduction in
interjudge sentencing disparity after the implementation of the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines. 2 With a sufficient number of cases, an
accurate and straightforward comparison of judicial leniency or se-
verity may be made relying on random case assignments. However,
the appropriateness of such comparisons is predicated on the validity
of the random assignment mechanism. That is, the case assignments
must be truly random in order to draw meaningful conclusions.21
There are many reasons to be skeptical that such mechanisms exist in
actual courtroom practice, 22 especially in Chicago during the time of
this present study.23
As an alternative to relying on random assignments for valid
comparisons, researchers may explicitly control for factors that are
correlated with judicial sentencing. One method of controlling for
19 Joel Waldfogel, Does Inter-Judge Disparity Justify Empirically Based Sentencing
Guidelines?, 18 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 293 (1998).
20 James M. Anderson et al., Measuring Interjudge Sentencing Disparity: Before and
After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 271 (1999).21 Cf Waldfogel, supra note 19. Waldfogel supports his use of random assignments by
examining whether caseloads for individual judges in his sample differed according to gen-
der. Gender, however, is but one element among many that could systematically generate a
biased distribution of an allegedly random process of case assignments. It should be noted
that Waldfogel does not rely solely on random assignments in his analysis. He also uses
multivariate analysis, controlling for many observable characteristics of the offense and the
offender.
22 Shari Seidman Diamond & Hans Zeisel, Sentencing Councils: A Study of Sentencing
Disparity and its Reduction, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 109, 112 (1975).
23 The assignment of cases by the Chief Justice of the Criminal Court was nominally
random, though for much of this period the case handling of the Criminal Court was broadly
viewed as given to widespread political corruption. THE ILLINOIS CRIME SURVEY (John H.
Wigmore ed., 1929). According to the procedural rules of the Criminal Court, "The Chief
Justice [of the Criminal Court] shall each term assign the cases for trial to the several
branches in rotation by numbers with such variations there from as in his judgment will tend
to expedite the disposition of cases." See CooK CTY. CRIM. CT. R. 15, (1920) as recorded in
GUNTHROP's LEGAL DIRECTORY OF CHICAGO, 1919-1920, 193 (Chi. Bar Ass'n ed., 15th ed.
1921). Yet, even the selection of the Chief Justice was given to political manipulation:
"[t]his is made possible by the fact that those in charge of assignments are elected officials
who often stand ready to distribute cases ... in exchange for political support and judicial
favors." ALBERT LEPAWSKY, THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF METROPOLITAN CHICAGO 62 (1932).
Today, cases are distributed through computer-generated random assignment, which has led
to some improvement.
[Vol. 92
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such factors is to place the set of cases being analyzed into subgroups
with similar relevant characteristics. Comparisons within subgroups
across different judges may then be used to identify judge-specific
effects. Edward Green, for instance, employed this procedure in his
examination of the Philadelphia criminal court, where he analyzed
1437 cases between 1956 and 1957 among 18 judges.2 4 Though
Green underestimated his own results, significant disparity among
judges was again found.25 Caution must be exercised when interpret-
ing these results, however, since cases within a subgroup may differ
in salient ways that are unobservable to the researchers. Our research
is based on simple analysis of variance and multivariate regression
techniques, which-for practical purposes-are the same as the sub-
group methodology described above, though somewhat more sophis-
ticated. We control for relevant non-judge variables by including
them, along with the judge-specific variables, in our regression equa-
tions. Unfortunately, just as with the subgroup comparison method,
omission of relevant unobserved factors will lead to biased results.
Since it is impossible to be certain that all relevant factors are in-
cluded in the analysis, bias will result if important omitted factors are
more likely to occur with a subset of judges.
Bias resulting from omitted variables will be unavoidable in
analyses of judicial decision-making unless the researcher is able
perfectly to control the variance among the cases and background
factors that judges face. Simulated or mock trials, which evaluate the
rulings of multiple judges over the same cases, have been used to
evaluate differences across judges in a perfectly controlled setting.
The problem with this setting is that the simulation itself may omit
some pertinent real-world consideration. To overcome the artificial-
ity of simulations, Shari Diamond and Hans Zeisel looked at New
York and Chicago sentencing councils, which consist of a panel of
judges who read pre-sentencing reports and offer sentencing recom-
mendations to the presiding trial judge.26 Judges on sentencing coun-
cils avoid the contrived nature of experiments because they are aware
their sentencing recommendation will affect real defendants. Using
24 See EDWARD GREEN, JUDICIAL ATTITUDES IN SENTENCING: A STUDY OF THE FACTORS
UNDERLYING THE SENTENCING PRACTICES OF THE CRIMINAL COURT OF PHILADELPHIA 15
(1961).
25 See Diamond & Zeisel, supra note 22, at 113.
26Id. at 109 ("[Sentencing councils enable] the sentencing judge, before imposing sen-
tence, to meet with his colleagues in order to learn what sentences they would impose if
they were the sentencing judge.").
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this thoughtful approach, Diamond and Zeisel were able to identify
significant disparity among the panel judges in terms of the types of
sentences (e.g., imprisonment or probation) and the length of sen-
tences.
One drawback, however, of using disparity among sentencing
councils as a proxy for courtroom variability is that the members of
the council are ultimately not issuing the sentence, but rather only
making a recommendation from a fairly anonymous vantage point.
This anonymity may have implications for sentencing decisions. For
example, since sentencing decisions take place in a broader political
context than the courtroom, the anonymity of the council may serve
to embolden or restrain judicial behavior. On the other hand, trial
judges know their decisions often have political resonance, which can
affect their job tenure. This consideration led Gaudet and his col-
leagues, in their 1933 study of New Jersey judges, to speculate that
there might be some impact of imminent reappointment on the sen-
tencing behavior of judges.2 7 Though they found no significant im-
pact, they suggested that a comparable analysis of a jurisdiction with
a judicial elective process, rather than an appointment process, would
be compelling.28 This Article provides that analysis by looking at
conviction rates and death sentences during and around judicial elec-
tion years in Chicago. First, however, the next section presents a
brief discussion of Chicago's criminal court structure in the late
1800's and early 1900's.
C. THE CRIMINAL COURT OF COOK COUNTY, 1870 TO 1930
During the period of our study (from 1870 to 1930), criminal
cases in Illinois were heard in any of several courts, including the
Circuit, City, County, Superior, Municipal, and Criminal courts.2 9
Yet, jurisdiction over cases involving more serious offenses, particu-
27 Gaudet et al., supra note 18, at 815 ("Another question which arose in the authors'
minds in working with these data [was] ... whether the imminence of a reappointment af-
fected the sentencing tendencies of these judges.").
28 Within an elective framework, the political influence on judges is in some ways abated
and in other ways exacerbated. See EDWARD M. MARTIN, THE ROLE OF THE BAR IN ELECTING
THE BENCH IN CHICAGO 294-99 (1936).
29 Membership and jurisdiction of these courts often overlapped significantly, producing
venue-shopping opportunities for clever defense attorneys and ambitious prosecutors.
These courts, however, generally did not have direct jurisdiction over criminal cases. 37 ILL.
REv. STAT. 701 (1931). For example, unlike the Circuit Courts of other Illinois counties, the
Circuit Court of Cook County had only quasi-criminal jurisdiction. See MARTIN, supra note
28, at 25.
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larly murder, was largely restricted to the Criminal Court of Cook
County (Criminal Court).3" The Criminal Court was staffed by
elected judges from the Circuit and Superior Courts of Cook
County.3' These judges were appointed to serve on the Criminal
Court for one to two years of their six-year elected terms.32 Judges
generally resisted appointments to the Criminal Court, especially
early in their elected terms.3 3 However, as their terms came to a
close, a Criminal Court assignment could be quite valuable: "judges
desire[d] to be assigned immediately before coming up for re-
election for the sake of profiting from the greater newspaper public-
ity. . . ."" For this and other reasons, we hypothesize that judicial
30 Judicial manipulation on the Criminal Court of Cook County was broadly acknowl-
edged. A comprehensive and critical study of the judicial process in Chicago may be found
in THE ILLINOIS CRIME SURVEY, supra note 23, which provides a "dismal and disconcerting
picture" of judicial administration at that time.
3 1 The election cycle for the Circuit Court commenced roughly on the first Monday of
June every six years, beginning in 1873 (single vacancies and special elections to expand the
Circuit court were held during various off years). Five judges were elected to the Circuit
Court in 1873, 1879, and 1885; eleven were chosen in 1891; fourteen in 1897, 1903 and
1909; twenty were chosen every sixth year from 1915 to 1933. Though Superior Court
judges also held six-year terms, their election cycle was less transparent. There were, in
fact, four separate approximate six-year cycles for the Superior court, labeled series A
through D. In election series A and B, voters selected a single judge every sixth year begin-
ning in 1873 and 1871, respectively. In series C, voters selected four judges in 1880 and
1886 and six judges every sixth year from 1892 to 1934. Series D elections placed one
judge on the bench in 1874, 1881, 1887, and 1893; fourjudges in 1900 and 1905; ten judges
in 1911; twelve in 1917; and twenty in 1923 and 1929. MARTrN, supra note 28, at 11-18.
32 ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, § 12 (1870), reprinted in ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONS 136
(Emil Joseph Verlie ed., 1919); 37 ILL. REV. STAT. 158-59 (1931); and 23 ILL. REV. STAT.
191 (1931). According to the Rules of the Criminal Court, the chief judges of the Circuit
and the Superior Courts had authority over the annual assignment of their members to the
Criminal Court. See COOK CTY. CRIM. CT. R. (1920), as recorded in GUNTHROP'S LEGAL
DIRECTORY OF CHICAGO, 1919-1920, supra note 25. In practice, however, an executive
committee of judges on the Circuit and Superior Courts assumed the role of determining as-
signments. See LEPAWSKY, supra note 23, at 164-76.
33 See JUDGE MICHAEL L. MCKINLEY, The Fine Art of the Fixer, in CRIME AND THE CIVIC
CANCER-GRAFT 22, 22 (The Chicago Daily News Reprints, Series No. 16, 1923) (the then
chief justice of the Criminal Court noted that "[t]hough service in the Criminal Court is dis-
tasteful to the majority of judges, by the rule of rotation they are sent to the criminal
branches toward the close of their elective term of six years."). The executive committees
regularly assigned the newly-elected judges to the Criminal Court in the early part of their
terms. LEPAWSKY, supra note 23, at 171.
34 See LEPAWSKY, supra note 23, at 167 (describing how judges on the Criminal Court of
Cook County leveraged their position during election time: "An alert judge assigned to a
criminal branch preceding an election, if he has a flair for tart comments and slogans about
crime, is practically able to assure his re-election.").
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sentencing will correlate with election cycles.35 Though primarily
focusing on the election cycles of judges, we also consider the impact
of the elections of other political players who exercised direct or indi-
rect influence over criminal cases, such as the mayor and the state's
attorney, the county's principal prosecutor.36 Prosecutors, of course,
had broad discretion in disposing of criminal cases-from the charg-
ing to the sentencing stages-but state's attorneys' influence in Chi-
cago extended beyond traditional prosecutorial discretion. 3' For in-
stance, Robert E. Crowe served as the Cook County's State's
Attorney for several years during our study, while simultaneously
leading the party machinery that controlled Republican judicial
nominations in Chicago. Crowe literally hand-picked the judges be-
fore whom he would argue his cases.38
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA AND THE EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
To assess whether judicial discretion impacts the likelihood of
35 The ILL. CONST. of 1870, art, VI, §24 (1870), reprinted in ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 32, at 140, provided a process for the selection of the chief judge of the Circuit
and Superior Courts, but there was no clear directive for the selection of the executive com-
mittees or the chiefjudge of the Criminal Court. In practice, it appears that the chief judge of
the Criminal Court voted from the Circuit Court one year and the Superior Court the next
year.
36 Barbara Caulfield, Access to Information in the Office of the State's Attorney of Cook
County, Illinois, 68 Nw. U. L. REV. 336, 336 (1973)("The power of the State's Attorney has
been described by the American Bar Association as 'enormous' and virtually 'unreviewable'
except for the period check of elections."). In a 2001 article, Ahmed E. Taha provided re-
cent evidence of the impact of prosecutorial power following the implementation of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. By constraining judicial discretion, Taha found that the
guidelines shifted "a great,deal of sentencing power from judges to prosecutors because
prosecutors choose which charges are filed against defendants." See Ahmed E. Taha, The
Equilibrium Effect of Legal Rule Changes: Are the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Being
Circumvented?, 21 INT'L L. REV. L. & ECON. 251, 251 (2001); cf William M. Rhodes &
Catherine Conly, Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Will They Shift Sentencing Discretion from
Judges to Prosecutors?, in COURTS AND JUDGES, supra note 7, at 197.
37 See James R. Kavanaugh, Representing the People of Illinois: Prosecutorial Power
and Its Limitations, 27 DEPAUL L. REV. 625 (discussing various discretionary mechanisms
available to prosecutors from the perspective of the Chief of the Criminal Bureau of the
Cook County State's Attorney's Office).
38 MARTIN, supra note 28, at 75-81. The Illinois Crime Commission noted that "[a]fter
the municipal election in 1927, the mayor, the state's attorney [Crowe], the coroner, the
chief of police, the sheriff of Cook County, and a majority of the judges on the criminal
courts were all affiliated with the dominant political faction in the county," leading to ineffi-
ciency and corruption. THE ILLINOIS CRIME SURVEY, supra note 23, at 17. "The records in-
dicate that literally thousands of felons were being released outright by the prosecutor." Id.
See also id. at 285-331 for a detailed discussion of prosecution of felony cases in Chicago.
[Vol. 92
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conviction and ultimate sentencing outcomes, we make use of de-
tailed historical data on murders occurring in Chicago in the late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. These data include inci-
dent-level detail on various aspects of murder cases, including in-
formation on trial disposition of arrested defendants and the name of
the trial judge hearing the case.
Our first empirical strategy exploits the fact that the majority of
judges appearing in these murder records are observed trying more
than one case. Specifically, we perform a one-way analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA) of several trial and sentencing outcomes in an at-
tempt to identify statistically whether judge-specific effects are im-
portant. We analyze three outcomes: the likelihood of a guilty
verdict, the likelihood of receiving a death sentence conditional on a
guilty verdict, and the likelihood of receiving a life sentence condi-
tional on a guilty verdict. To illustrate the basic method, suppose that
we observe K judges (indexed by k = 1,.. .,K) who each try N cases
(indexed by n = 1,. . .,N). Define the outcome Guiltynk as an indica-
tor variable equal to one if trial n heard by judge k resulted in a guilty
verdict and equal to zero otherwise. The judge-specific conviction
rates are defined by the K equations
N
I_ Guiltyk
Guiltyk N n=1 ,for k =1,...,K,N
while the overall conviction rate is defined by the equation
K N
Z Z Guiltyk
Guilty = k=1 n=1
N*K
Assume for the moment that judges do not affect the likelihood
that a trial results in a guilty verdict (that is, suppose that the null hy-
pothesis of no judge effects is true). Under this assumption, the
overall variance in the variable Guiltynk can be estimated using both
the within-judge variation in this outcome and the variation occur-
ring between judges. The variation occurring within judges is de-
fined by the judge-specific sums of squared deviations about the
judge-specific means. This is given by the K equations
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=N
SSk = (Guilyk - Guiltyk ) 2 , for k = K.
n=l
This within-judge variation is used to estimate the variance in






Under the null hypothesis, the MSW is a consistent estimate of
the variance of Guiltynk. An alternative estimate is provided by the
equation for the mean square between (MSB), or
K




which, assuming no judge effects, also provides a consistent es-
timate of the variance in Guiltyk. This latter estimate exploits the
fact that sampling variation of the judge-specific means around the
overall mean is proportional to the overall variance in the guilty indi-
cator variable.
Under the null hypothesis of no effect of judicial discretion on
outcomes, these two variance estimates should be similar. Alterna-
tively stated, under the null hypothesis the ratio MSB/MSW should
be equal to one. If the null hypothesis is false, however, between-
judge variation should exceed the variation that one would expect to
result from sampling variation alone. In other words, the MSB
should be larger than the MSW, and the ratio of the two should ex-
ceed one. Hence, a simple test for an effect of judicial discretion is a
test of the null hypothesis
H0: MSB/MSW = 1
against the alternative hypothesis
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HI: MSB/MSW > 1.
This ANOVA test compares the unadjusted variation occurring
between judges to the variation occurring within judges and tests
whether the between-judge variation is too large relative to the
within-judge variation to be consistent with no role for judicial dis-
cretion. One problem with this test concerns the fact that this simple
empirical tool does not account for systematic variation in the types
of cases that are handled by the judges observed in the sample. For
example, it may be that over the course of their careers, certain
judges receive cases that, on average, involve more heinous circum-
stances than the cases heard by other judges. To the extent that this
is the case, some judges will have higher conviction rates on average
than others. These differences, however, would reflect variation in
the average circumstances of the cases heard rather than differences
in the manner with which the judge managed the trial and sentencing
proceedings.
One method of addressing these concerns would be to test for
the statistical significance of judge-specific effects on trial and sen-
tencing outcomes in the context of a multivariate regression. Spe-
cifically, define the variable Guiltynk as above and let Xnk be a vector
of characteristics of the defendant, the victim, and the circumstances
of the nth murder case heard by the kth judge. Using ordinary least
squares (OLS), we could estimate the linear regression equation
Guilty,,k = a + ak + fB' X,,k + E k ,
where cc is a common intercept term, CCk is a judge-specific in-
tercept term that is defined for K-1 judges, 3 is a vector of coeffi-
cients corresponding to the control variables included in Xk, and Enk
is a normally-distributed error term with a mean of zero. The regres-
sion-adjusted test for judicial discretion would test this model with
variable intercepts against a constrained regression model with a sin-
gle intercept for all judges. In other words, a test for judge effects is
a test of the joint statistical significance of the K-1 judge effects that
are included in the regression specification. Below, we present both
tests for judge effects that do not account for systematic variation in
the types of cases heard as well as tests for judge effects that adjust
for observable covariates.
Our second empirical strategy for assessing whether judicial dis-
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cretion played an important role in determining our three trial and
sentencing outcomes is to assess whether the likelihood of each out-
come differs when the murder occurs during a judicial election year.
To the extent that judges benefited politically from stiff outcomes in
an election year and if judges have some discretion over outcomes,
one might expect differential outcomes in election years relative to
non-election years.
To test this hypothesis, we exploit the timing of judicial elec-
tions during the time period covered by our sample. For Circuit court
judges, elections occurred every six years.39 Using the names of each
judge as reported in the murder records we researched historical re-
cords in order to identify those judges serving on Circuit courts. We
then restrict the sample to those murders that were tried by Circuit
court judges." With this restricted sample, we estimate the model
Guilty,nk = a + ak + yElect,,k + /' X,,k + 6,1k,
where all of the variables are defined as above and the variable
Electnk is a dummy variable equal to one if the offense occurs during
an election year. We estimate several variants of this model (without
other control variables, controlling for a host of defendant, victim,
and incident characteristics, and controlling for these covariates plus
judge-specific fixed effects) for each of the three trial and sentencing
outcomes discussed above. We interpret positive and statistically
significant coefficients on the election year dummy as evidence of
judicial discretion impacting outcomes.
We use data from the Northwestern University School of Law
Project for the Study of Homicide in Chicago. The database provides
detailed information on all murders occurring in the city of Chicago
between 1870 and 1930 that were recorded by the police. Research-
ers on the Homicide project took handwritten reports summarizing
details of specific homicides (such as characteristics of the murder,
victim and defendant characteristics, whether arrests were made, and
post arrest trial outcomes) and coded these details into a uniform set
of variables amenable to statistical analysis. The database includes
39 For the time period covered in our sample, Circuit court elections occurred in 1891,
1897, 1903, 1909, 1915, 1921, 1927, and 1933.
40 Identifying election years for Superior court judges is considerably more difficult
since there were four separate Superior court election cycles and the historical records do not
clearly indicate on which cycle on each Superior court judge was elected.
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such information on over 10,000 murders occurring during this pe-
riod.
Given the nature of the inquiry, we impose several sample re-
strictions to arrive at our final sample for analysis. First, since we are
interested in studying the role of judges in determining trial out-
comes, we restrict the sample to those murders where an arrest is re-
corded, where there is information on the trial outcome, and where
the judge hearing the trial is explicitly identified. Furthermore, since
our simple ANOVA test and the regression-adjusted test for judge
effects require that there be at least two trials per judge, we restrict
the sample to observations where there is at least one other trial heard
by the same judge. These combined sample restrictions reduce the
size of the final sample used to analyze the determinants of guilty
verdicts to 2631 murder trials. These murder trials are heard by 139
separate judges. Of these, 1302 murder trials were heard in Circuit
courts. Hence, the sub-sample used to test for an election year effect
is approximately half the size used to test for judge effects.
For our analysis of the determinants of the likelihood of receiv-
ing a death or a life sentence, we must further restrict the sample to
observations where there is complete information on the ultimate
sentence handed down to those defendants found guilty. This addi-
tional restriction reduces the sample size for the analysis of these
outcomes to 851. These sentencing proceedings are handled by 97
separate judges. In the regression models that adjust for observable
aspects of the crime, we further restrict the sample to those observa-
tions with complete information on the additional explanatory vari-
ables. For all three outcomes, this additional restriction reduces the
sample size by about one-third. Of these outcomes, approximately
half were tried in Circuit courts.
Figures 1 through 3 graphically depict the degree of between-
judge variation in the three outcomes that we analyze. The figures
are constructed as follows: For Figure 1, we first calculated judge-
specific conviction rates by calculating the mean of the dummy vari-
able indicating a guilty verdict for each judge. The figure then plots
the distribution of these judge-specific conviction rates. Figures 2
and 3 perform the similar calculations for a dummy variable indicat-
ing a death sentence and a dummy variable indicating a life sentence.
There is considerable variation for all three outcomes. The distribu-
tion of conviction rates in Figure 1 is dual-peaked, with a spike at
conviction rates of 0 and conviction rates falling in the 0.36 to 0.45
category. The dispersion around this central category is substantial.
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The dispersion in death sentences shown in Figure 2 is consid-
erably less. The modal judge-specific rate is 0, with over 60% of
judges presiding over sentencing proceedings that never resulted in a
death penalty. Nonetheless, there are some judges that have consis-
tently higher rates, with approximately 15% falling in the 0.01 to
0.11 category, 11% falling in the 0.11 to 0.22 category, and 6% fal-
ling in the 0.22 to 0.33 category. The rates at which sentencing re-
sults in life sentences are considerably more disperse, with the distri-
bution in Figure 3 resembling the distribution of conviction rates in
Figure 1. Again, there appear to be two peaks, one at zero and one in
the 0.11 to 0.33 range, with a fair degree of dispersion around the
more central peak.
The three figures reveal considerable visual dispersion in the
rates of conviction, sentences to death, and sentences to life, when
murder trials are grouped by the judges hearing the cases. What is
left to be seen is whether this dispersion is a statistically significant
departure from the case of equal rates across all judges. We now turn
to the results from such empirical test.
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III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A. RESULTS FROM THE UNADJUSTED ONE-WAY ANALYSIS-OF-
VARIANCE
Table 1 presents the results from an unadjusted analysis-of-
variance for our three trial and sentencing outcomes. Panel A pre-
sents results for variation in a dummy variable indicating a guilty
verdict, Panel B presents results for variation in a dummy variable
indicating a death sentence, while Panel C presents results for varia-
tion in a dummy variable indicating that the defendant received a life
sentence. Each panel reports the standard ANOVA results: the first
column presents the degrees of freedom for the between-judge,
within-judge, and total variation calculations, the second column
presents the between, within and total sum of squares, the third col-
umn presents estimates of the MSB and the MSW, while the fourth
column presents the ratio, MSB/MSW.
Recall that under the null hypothesis of no judge effects, this ra-
tio should be equal to one. Under the alternative hypothesis, this ra-
tio should exceed one. For relatively large samples, this ratio has an
F-distribution, which thus allows us to test whether the departure
from one is statistically significant. The final column presents the p-
value (the likelihood of observing a ratio at least as large as the test
statistics under the null hypothesis) from such a test for each panel.
Specifically, the figure provides the area under the tail of the F-
distribution to the right of the constructed ratio. Small values indi-
cate that deviation from one at least as large as that which is observed
is relatively unlikely.
Beginning with the results for conviction rates, the between
judge variation is large relative to the within-judge variation, with
the MSB nearly double the MSW. The probability of observing such
an outcome when the no judge effects null hypothesis is true is very
unlikely (the p-value is 0.0001). Hence, the results in Panel A
strongly indicate an effect of judicial discretion on the likelihood of
conviction.
Similarly, the results for the variable indicating that the con-
victed defendant received a death sentence indicate that the between-
judge variation in death sentence rates is too large relative to the
amount of within-judge variation in this variable to be consistent
with the null hypothesis of no judge effects. The MSB is approxi-
mately 30% greater than the MSW. Moreover, the departure of the
ratio of these two variables from one is statistically significant at the
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5% level of confidence (the p-value is 0.0326). Hence, these results
also indicate a significant role of discretion in determining who re-
ceived the death sentence.
Table 1
Initial Analysis of Variance of Trial and Sentencing Outcomes: Do
Judges Matter?
Panel A: Variation in Trials that Result in Convictions
Degrees of Sum of Mean F-Statistic Prob (F >
Freedom Squares Square Test Sta-
tistic)
Between 138 64.52 0.47 2.01 0.0001
Judge
Within 2,492 578.41 0.23 -
Judge
Total 2,630 642.92 - -
Panel B: Variation in Convictions that Result in Death Sentences
Degrees of Sum of Mean F-Statistic Prob (F >
Freedom Squares Square Test Sta-
tistic)
Between 96 9.52 0.10 1.31 0.0326
Judge
Within 754 57.22 0.08 -
Judge
Total 850 66.74 -
Panel C: Variation in Conviction that Result in Life Sentences
Degrees of Sum of Mean F-Statistic Prob (F >
Freedom Squares Square Test Sta-
tistic)
Between 96 22.93 0.24 1.20 0.1021
Judge
Within 754 149.82 0.20 -
Judge
Total 850 172.75 -
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The weakest evidence of an effect of judicial discretion is ob-
served in Panel C. Again the between-judge variation is large rela-
tive to the within-judge variation, with a ratio of the mean squares
equal to 1.2. However, the F-test indicates that values at least as
large as that which we observe would occur at least 10% of the time
under the null hypothesis. Hence, there is some evidence that discre-
tion is important for this outcome, yet the observed result is only
weakly significant.
An alternative way of gauging the importance of judicial discre-
tion in determining these outcomes is to analyze the proportion of
variation in these outcomes that can be attributed to between-judge
variation. This figure can be calculated by dividing the sum of
squares between by the total sum of squares (both figures are pre-
sented in the second columns of the individual panels). For convic-
tion rates, approximately 10% of the overall variation in this outcome
is attributable to between-judge variation, while for death sentence
and life sentence rates, approximately 14% and 13%, respectively, is
attributable to between-judge variation in these outcomes.
The ANOVA tests presented in Table 1 do not account for pos-
sible variation in the circumstances of murder incidents that may ex-
plain inter-judge variation in conviction rates and sentencing out-
comes. For instance, it may be that certain judges, by chance,
received trials that were clear convictions. To account .for this possi-
bility, we extracted several additional variables from the Northwest-
em database that more fully described the circumstances of each in-
cident and that may be related to the probability of being convicted
and the severity of the sentence. Table 2 presents the means of these
additional explanatory variables for the analysis sample stratified by
the values of the three dependent variables. Specifically, the table
presents the means of these variables for trials resulting in guilty ver-
dicts and not guilty verdicts, for convictions with death sentences and
convictions without death sentences, and for convictions with life
sentences and convictions without life sentences.
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Table 2





Black Victim 0.26 0.25
Male 0.94 0.86
Teflendnnt
Male Victim 0.73 0.84
Victim 0 to 5 0.14 0.07
years
Victim 6 to 10 0.01 0.01
years
Victim 11 to 0.07 0.07
20 years
Victim 21 to 0.58 0.63
40 years
Victim older 0.20 0.22
than 40
Victim Police 0.06 0.04
Defendant 0.01 0.02
Police
Victim/ Defendant 0.19 0.14
Related
Multiple Victims 0.05 0.03
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Year of the
Murder
1890-1900 0.12 0.04 0.11 0.14 0.09 0.16
1901-1910 0.26 0.15 0.28 0.22 0.22 0.23
1911-1920 0.22 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.27 0.21
1921-1930 0.41 0.57 0.39 0.41 0.42 0.41
N 755 1,017 57 525 162 420
Samples restricted to observations with complete information on all ex-
planatory variables.
The additional covariates include indicator variables for whether
the defendant is African-American, whether the victim is African-
American, and for the gender of the defendant and victim, several in-
dicator variables for the age of the victim, variables indicating
whether the victim or defendant is a police officer, and a dummy
variable indicating whether the victim and defendant are related. We
also constructed dummy variables indicating whether there are multi-
ple victims, multiple defendants, and multiple arrests. For the de-
scriptive purposes of Table 2, we present the year distributions for
the sample using ten-year intervals. In the regression models that
follow we control for a complete set of year dummy variables for the
period from 1890 to 1930.
There are several interesting patterns evident in Table 2. For ex-
ample, those trials that end in a guilty verdict are disproportionately
comprised of cases where the defendant was African-American.
There also appears to be a relationship between the murder victim's
race and the likelihood that the convicted defendant receives the
death sentence (with murders of black victims considerably less
likely to result in a death sentence). Other interesting patterns in-
clude the large difference in the proportion of murders where the vic-
tim is a police officer between convicted murderers receiving the
death sentence and convicted murderers that do not, and the apparent
effect of a relationship between the defendant and victim on the like-
lihood of receiving either a death or life sentence. To the extent that
some of these factors differ among judges, such relationships may
explain the significant judge effects evident in the unadjusted analy-
sis of variance presented in Table 1.
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Table 3










Victim - (0.072) (0.072)
Male Defendant 0.271 0.272
(0.039) (0.039)
Male Victim -0.158 -0.156
(0.030) (0.030)
Victim 0 to 5
years 0.011 -0.084
(0.051) (0.056)
Victim 6 to 10
years -0.034 0.006
(0.121) (0.120)
Victim 11 to 20
years 0.032 0.015
- (0.049) (0.049)






Defendant Po- -0.100 -0.057
lice Officer - (0.095) (0.095)
Vic-
tim/Defendant 0.095 0.100









Multiple Ar- 0.085 0.077
rests (0.067) (0.068)
Judge Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies No No Yes
F-Statistica 1.882 1.827 1.226
(P-value) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.049)
R' 0.128 0.193 0.223
N 1,772 1,772 1,772
Standard errors are in parentheses. All regression include a constant
term.
a. F-statistic and P-Value for tests of the joint significance of the judge
dummy variables.
B. TESTING FOR JUDGE EFFECTS HOLDING CONSTANT OBSERVABLE
ASPECTS OF THE INCIDENTS
Tables 3 and 4 present regression estimation results that account
for the influence of the variables listed in Table 1. Table 3 presents
three regression specifications where the dependent variable is an in-
dicator variable equal to one when a trial results in a guilty verdict
and zero otherwise. Note, the size of the sample used to estimate the
regressions is somewhat smaller than the size of the sample used in
the unadjusted ANOVA in Table 1 (for the analysis of guilty ver-
dicts, 1772 observations versus 2631 observations in Table 1). The
reduction in sample size is due to the additional restriction that there
be complete information for all of the explanatory variables listed in
Table 2. To facilitate comparison with the unadjusted ANOVA re-
sults in Table 1, the first regression in column (1) includes an inter-
cept and K-1 (where K is the number of judges) judge dummy vari-
ables only. The F-statistic from the test of the significance of the
regression is equivalent to the F-statistic from the ANOVA tables
presented above. This F-statistic along with p-value of the test is
presented at the bottom of the table. Hence, the first regression pro-
vides an unadjusted test for judge effects for the restricted sample
that is comparable to the results in Table 1 for the larger sample. The
second regression in Table 3 adds the control variables listed in Table
[Vol. 92
LIFE TERMS OR DEATH SENTENCES
2 while the third specification adds year dummy variables to the
specification in column (2). Again, the F-statistic at the bottom of
the table is the test statistic from a test of the joint significance of the
K-1 judge dummy variables and presents the regression-adjusted
equivalent to the unadjusted ANOVA test for judge effects presented
above.
The results in the first column of Table 3 basically confirm the
findings in Table 1. The between-judge variation in conviction rates
is nearly 80% greater than the variance estimate using the within-
judge variation. The p-value on the test of the significance of this
departure is 0.0001. Hence, the concordance between these results
and those in Table 1 indicates that the additional sample restriction is
not affecting the basic pattern. Adding the controls to the specifica-
tion in column (2) does not appreciably affect the main result. The
F-statistic from the test of the joint significance of the judge dum-
mies is still considerably larger than 1 and statistically significant at
the 0.0001 level of confidence. Adding year dummies to the regres-
sion specification does indeed reduce the amount of residual be-
tween-judge variation in conviction rates, as is evidence by the re-
duction in the F-statistic. Nonetheless, the judge dummy variables
are still statistically significant at the 5% level of confidence. Hence,
the results in Table 3 provide strong confirmation of the results pre-
sented in Panel A of Table 1.
In addition to the evidence concerning judge effects, there are
some very stark patterns evident in the partial effects of the explana-
tory variables on the likelihood of conviction. There is an enormous
effect of the race of the defendant on the likelihood of a guilty ver-
dict. In both specifications (2) and (3), black defendants are 21.5
percentage points more likely to be convicted of murder than are
white defendants. These estimates are both significant at the 1%
level of confidence. The effect of the race of the defendant is miti-
gated somewhat when the victim is black. The interaction term be-
tween black victim and black defendant is negative and marginally
significant in both regressions. The magnitude of the interaction
term indicates that relative to murder cases where the victim and de-
fendant are both white, cases where the victim and defendant are both
black are approximately 10 percentage points more likely to result in
a conviction while cases where the defendant is black and victim is
white are approximately 21.5 percentage points more likely to result
in a conviction. There is also a large positive effect of the defendant
being male on the likelihood of conviction and a large negative effect
of the victim being male. Finally, there are statistically significant
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positive effects on the likelihood of conviction when the victim is a
police officer and when the incident involves multiple victims.
Table 4 presents comparable results for the sentencing outcomes.
The first three regressions present results where the dependent vari-
able is equal to one if the convicted defendant was sentenced to death
while the next three regressions present results where the dependent
variable is equal to one if the convicted defendant received a life sen-
tence. Starting with the death sentence results, the estimation results
in the first specification confirm the unadjusted findings in Table 1.
The F-statistic and p-value at the bottom of the table indicate that the
judge effects for the restricted sample are statistically significant at
the 2% level of confidence. Adding the variables to the specification
in column (2) weakens the significance of the judge effects with a
new p-value of 0.077. However, adding year dummy variables to the
regression yields a test statistic for the significance of the judge ef-
fects that is larger and statistically significant at the 3% level of con-
fidence. Hence, the significant judge effects on the likelihood that a
convicted offender received the death sentence survive the addition
of controls for the circumstances of the incident.
For the dependent variable indicating a life sentence, there is no
evidence of significant judge effects. The test of the significance of
the judge dummies in the base case with no controls (column (4))
fails to reject the hypothesis of no judge effects at a reasonable level
of significance (the p-value is 0.179). Recall that the ANOVA test in
Table 1 using the larger sample was just barely significant. Adding
control variables in columns (2) and (3) completely eliminates all
evidence of significant judge effects for these outcomes (as is evident
by the F-statistics that are essentially equal to one). Hence, for this
final outcome, there is little evidence of a statistically significant role
of judicial discretion in sentencing.
Unlike the results in the regression models for the likelihood of a
conviction, there are few independently significant effects among the
explanatory variables included in the regression specifications. One
variable which exerts a consistent positive and statistically significant
effect for both dependent variables is the dummy variable indicating
that the victim is a police officer. In the death sentence models, mur-
derers of police officers are 10 to 15 percentage points more likely to
receive the death sentence and 8 to 15 percentage points more likely
to receive life sentences.
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Table 4
Judge Effects on the Likelihood of a Receiving a Death or Life Sentence
Conditional on Being Convicted
Dependent Variable=Death Dependent Variable=Life
Sentence Sentence
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Multiple Ar- 0.097 0.026 0.104 0.161
rests (0.070) (0.072) - (0.108) (0.116)
Judge Dum-
mies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dum-
mies No No Yes No No Yes
F-Statistic a 1.393 1.244 1.350 1.150 1.001 1.027
(P-value) (0.0148) (0.077) (0.026) (0.179) (0.4812) (0.421)
R2  0.208 0.259 0.365 0.178 0.217 0.284
N 582 582 582 582 582 582
Standard errors are in parentheses. All regression include a constant
term.
a. F-statistic and P-Value for tests of the joint significance of the judge
dummy variables.
To summarize the results, we find strong unambiguous evidence
that the judge trying the case is a statistically significant predictor of
the likelihood of a conviction and of the likelihood of receiving a
death sentence conditional on a conviction. These patterns are evi-
dent in the unadjusted data as well as in models that control for ob-
servable aspects of the murder incident. We find little evidence that
judicial discretion plays a role in the likelihood that convicted mur-
derers received a life sentence.
C. TESTING FOR AN IMPACT OF ELECTION YEARS
As outlined in the methodology section, our second empirical
strategy tests for an impact of the homicide trial occurring during an
election on the three trial and sentencing outcomes analyzed in this
study. Recall that for this exercise, we further restrict the sample to
those homicide trials that were heard by Circuit court judges.
Table 5 presents the results of these model estimates. For each
outcome, the table presents the regression coefficients on the election
year dummy from linear regressions of the outcome indicator on the
election year variable. Concerning other covariates, three specifica-
tions are estimated for each outcome. The first specification controls
for the election year dummy only and hence provides a base estimate
of the difference in means between election and non-election years
for conviction rates, death sentence rates, and life sentence rates. The
second specification adds all of the control variables listed in Table 2
to the first specification (with the exception of the year indicators).
The final specification adds a complete set of judge dummies to the
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second specification. The election year effects by outcome are or-
ganized by column, while each row corresponds to one of the three
specifications of the right hand side of the regression models.
Table 5
Estimates of the Effect of the Offense Occurring During a Circuit Court
Election Year on the Likelihood of the Trial Outcomes
Guilty Verdict Death Sentence Life Sentence
-0.011 (0.036) 0.097 (0.038)** 0.002 (0.060)
0.031 (0.044) 0.139 (0.051)*** -0.063 (0.073)
0.041 (0.046) 0.145 (0.057) ** -0.106 (0.084)
Standard errors are in parentheses. The coefficients presented are the coefficients from a
regression of the trial outcomes on a dummy variable indicating that the offense occurred
during a Circuit-court election year. Specification (1) regresses the outcome on the elec-
tion year dummy only. Specification (2) adds all of the explanatory variables (with the
exception of the year variables) listed in Table 2 to the model specification. Specification
(3) adds a complete set of judge dummy variables to the model in specification (2).
** Statistically significant at the 5% level of confidence.
***Statistically significant at the 1% level of confidence.
The results for the guilty verdict outcome indicate that there is
no statistically significant difference in the proportion of trials result-
ing in a guilty verdict between election and non-election years. This
pattern is consistent across all three specifications.
For the death sentence outcome, on the other hand, the propor-
tion of murders resulting in a death sentence (conditional on a con-
viction) is larger and statistically distinguishable from the compara-
ble proportion in non-election years. In the model omitting other
covariates, this difference is approximately 10 percentage points and
is significant at the 5% level of confidence. Adding the controls in
specifications (2) and (3) actually increases the point estimate to be-
tween 14 and 14.5 percentage points. Both estimates are also statisti-
cally significant.
Finally, there is no evidence that the propensity to give out life
sentences increases in election years. The point estimate of the elec-
tion year effect is not stable across specifications. Moreover, none of
the point estimates are statistically significant.4t
41 Regressions with mayoral and prosecutorial election years revealed no significant pat-
terns with convictions and election years.
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TV. CONCLUSION
Using historical data on murders in Chicago from 1870 to 1930,
this Article examined the impact of judge-specific effects on the like-
lihood that a defendant would be found guilty of murder and the like-
*lihood of the defendant receiving various sentences. We observe
significant judge-specific effects for both convictions and sentencing
outcomes. Additionally, we observe a strong relationship between
election years for judges and the likelihood that a defendant will re-
ceive a death sentence. Defendants in our sample were approxi-
mately 15% more likely to be sentenced to death when the sentence
was issued during the trial judge's election year. The size and sig-
nificance of correlation between judicial election years and death
sentences is in some ways surprising because Chicago judges gener-
ally did not have discretion to order death sentences. That is, if a de-
fendant did not waive his or her right to a jury trial, then the jury de-
cided both the guilty verdict and the sentence.42 Of course, even in a
jury trial, judges were still able to influence the juries' decisions in
various ways, particularly through jury instructions. During the pe-
riod of this study, the electoral incentives for trial judges might have
encouraged them to facilitate a death sentence, only to later privately
request clemency from the governor. Through private communica-
tions with the governor, trial judges were often the most influential
voice advocating or challenging the worthiness of the defendant's re-
quest for clemency.43
A more contemporaneous examination of the connection be-
tween judicial elections and capital sentencing would constitute a
valuable line of future research. Particularly useful would be an
analysis that compares a jurisdiction where juries decide on death
sentences with a jurisdiction where judges have full discretion to im-
42 See Act of Mar. 5, 1867, 1867 11. Laws 90, 90 (establishes law according to which
juries in capital cases would decide both guilt and punishment). Around the beginning of the
data set used in this analysis, many states, including Illinois, departed from laws requiring a
mandatory death penalty for defendants found guilty of certain offenses to a system where
the jury was given the discretion to impose death. Juries were given discretion in many
states because lawmakers feared juries would not convict clearly guilty defendants for whom
they did not view a death sentence to be appropriate. BANNER, supra note 4, at 214-16.
43 We are grateful to Stuart Banner for bringing this point to our attention. The governor
may then have to pay the political price the judge avoided in guiding the jury toward a death
sentence. Governors may have been more insulated from the political consequences of
granting clemency than they are today simply because clemency was more frequently or-
dered. Governors during that period commuted death sentences to imprisonment at rates
between 25% and 50%, which are much higher rates than those seen today.
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pose death sentences, such as in Alabama. In these jurisdictions,
where ultimate responsibility for a life or death sentence cannot be
placed on the jury, a politically-minded elected judge may be more
responsive to popular opinion about capital punishment.
640 RICHARD R. W. BROOKS & STEVEN RAPHAEL [Vol. 92
